Timko v. Triarsi: How to Prevent Predatory Strike Suits while Avoiding Inequitable Results by Cohen, Zachary D.
Journal of Business & Technology Law
Volume 2 | Issue 1 Article 20
Timko v. Triarsi: How to Prevent Predatory Strike
Suits while Avoiding Inequitable Results
Zachary D. Cohen
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/jbtl
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons
This Notes & Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Business & Technology Law by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information,
please contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Zachary D. Cohen, Timko v. Triarsi: How to Prevent Predatory Strike Suits while Avoiding Inequitable Results, 2 J. Bus. & Tech. L. 145
(2007)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/jbtl/vol2/iss1/20
ZACHARY D. COHEN*
Timko v. Triarsi: How to Prevent Predatory Strike
Suits while Avoiding Inequitable Results
IN TIMKO V. TRIARISI,' THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS OF Florida's Fifth District
considered whether a plaintiff in a derivative action must maintain share ownership
throughout the pendency of the suit. The court dismissed the derivative suit and
held that a plaintiff who fails to maintain ownership through the duration of the
suit violates the continuous ownership requirement and therefore lacks standing.
The language of Florida's statutory contemporaneous ownership rule does not re-
quire ownership throughout the suit. Courts, however, have construed it to, and
this judicial application of the rule has lead to inequitable results. By adhering to
such an expansive interpretation of the contemporaneous ownership requirement,
the Timko court has failed to account for the different methods by which share-
holders are divested of their ownership interest. To ameliorate the inequity of the
application of the contemporaneous ownership requirement, this note proposes
three exceptions to the contemporaneous ownership rule: (i) where the plaintiff
seeks to challenge a merger that has divested his ownership; (ii) where there is an
involuntary divestment of ownership through a bad act of management; and (iii)
situations where no one else can vindicate the rights of the company.
I. THE CASE
In August 1998, Appellant Mark Timko formed Ferrari of Central Florida ("Fer-
rari"), with Appellee Onoforio Triarsi.2 The purpose of this entity was to operate a
franchised car dealership under the Ferrari name in the Orlando area.3 Per their
agreement, both Mr. Timko and Mr. Triarsi were individually assigned fifty percent
of the shares in the enterprise.4
* B.A, University of Virginia; J.D., cum laude, University of Maryland School of Law.
1. Timko v. Triarsi, 898 So. 2d 89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
2. Id. at 92. Interestingly, the online records of the corporate register for the Florida Secretary of State list
the incorporation date of Ferrari of Central Florida as June 19, 1998. http://www.sunbiz.org/COR/1998/0625/
80566968.TIF. This alternate date is confirmed on Ferrari's 1999 Annual Report. http://www.sunbiz.org/COR/
1999/0629/14000215.TIF. It is unclear why the Court reported that the company was formed in August of 1998.
3. Id.
4. Id. Despite, their equal ownership, Mr. Timko and Mr. Triarsi had different levels of involvement with
the management of the dealership. Mr. Timko, as President and General Manager of the dealership, was inti-
mately involved with the day-to-day operations of the company. As a result of his active role in the company,
Mr. Timko would receive both salary and benefits, in addition to any dividends due to his stock ownership in
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To finance Ferrari, the company borrowed $400,000 from an individual named
Oscar Davis in exchange for a promissory note.' The loan documents used to se-
cure this financing contained a "conversion right" that allowed anyone who pur-
chased the remainder of Ferrari's debt to convert the unpaid balance of the loan
into one-hundred percent of the equity in Ferrari.6 At some point after the dealer-
ship's opening in November 1998, Mr. Triarsi used his recently formed company,
Triarsi Enterprises, Ltd., to purchase Ferrari's residual debt from Mr. Davis and
subsequently exercised the conversion right to obtain one-hundred percent equity
in the dealership.7 Through this right, Mr. Triarisi was able to increase his interest
in the dealership while divesting Mr. Timko of his fifty percent stake in Ferrari.!
After he was ousted from the company, Mr. Timko filed a complaint in the
Circuit Court for Orange County seeking "declaratory relief, an accounting, dam-
ages for breach of fiduciary duty, and dissolution of the corporation" under section
607.1430 of the Florida Statutes. 9 The court noted that Florida law gave Mr. Triarsi
the right to purchase Mr. Timko's shares at fair market value.'l Although the court
determined that the fair market value of Mr. Timko's shares was $138,000, it did
not, at that time, order payment to Mr. Timko."
Prior to the entry of a final judgment ordering payment, Mr. Timko filed a
separate shareholder derivative action on behalf of Ferrari. 2 Mr. Timko was still a
shareholder when he filed this derivative action because the final judgment order-
ing payment for the divestment of his shares was not yet entered. 3 After Mr. Timko
filed his derivative suit on behalf of the corporation, the final judgment was entered
on November 13, 2003 in his action for individual damages.'4 Per the final order,
Mr. Triarsi was obligated to pay Mr. Timko $138,000 within ten days of the date of
Ferrari. Id. In contrast, Mr. Triarsi appears to not have been actively involved in the management of the
dealership because he stayed in New Jersey. Id.
5. id.
6. Id. at 92-93.
7. It is implicit from the facts of the case that Mr. Triarsi was aware of this provision in the loan docu-
ments and likely purchased the debt with the intention to remove Mr. Timko from the company. It is unclear,
however, whether Mr. Timko was aware of the conversion right.
8. Timko, 898 So. 2d at 93.
9. Id. Section 607.1430 provides various grounds for judicial dissolution including deadlock, fraud, and
waste of corporate assets. FLA. STAT. § 607.1430 (2000).
10. Id. Specifically, the court cited to Mr. Triarsi's rights under Section 607.1436 which provides that in a
shareholder initiated proceeding to dissolve a corporation, "the corporation ... may elect to purchase all shares
owned by the petitioning shareholder at the fair value of the shares. An election pursuant to this section shall
be irrevocable unless the court determines that it is equitable to set aside or modify this election." Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. In his derivative suit, Mr. Timko alleged "breach of fiduciary duty... as well as self-dealing and
conversion." Id. Specifically, Mr. Timko alleged as a result of his fifty percent ownership in Ferrari he was
entitled to $733,000-an amount which was supported by Ferrari's own income tax document and one that he
had never received. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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the order.' Additionally, the court order declared: "Effective the date of this order,
Mr. Timko shall no longer have any rights or status as a shareholder of Ferrari of
Central Florida, except the right to receive amounts awarded by this order, which,
subject to all provisions of this order and section 607.1436, shall be enforceable in
the same manner as any other judgment."1 6
After the entry of the November order, Mr. Triarsi and Triari Enterprises, Ltd.
filed a motion to dismiss the shareholder derivative suit.' 7 The Defendants asserted
that, as a result of the November 13, 2003 order, Mr. Timko had lost standing to
continue the derivative action. 8 The Circuit Court for Orange County agreed and
granted Mr. Trairsi's motion to dismiss. 9 Mr. Timko filed a timely appeal in the
District Court of Appeal of Florida for the Fifth District.2 °
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Courts have been asked to address the misuse of shareholder derivative suits since
1881 when the Supreme Court decided Hawes v. City of Oakland.2' In that case, the
Court set forth numerous principles to ensure that derivative suits comported with
their purpose-the redress of wrongs on behalf of the corporation in a manner
consistent with the interests of the corporation and its shareholders.22 One of the
longstanding principles propounded in Hawes pertained to a shareholder's stand-
ing to maintain a derivative action.22 For a shareholder to have standing, the Court
decreed that a plaintiff must allege he was a shareholder at the time of the transac-
tion complained of or he obtained his shares since the transaction by the operation
of law.24 One year later, in 1882, the Court codified its decision in Hawes by adopt-
ing Equity Rule 94, the original predecessor to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1
and the first of many in a series of federal rules relating to derivative suits.
25
In 1966, Congress adopted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 with the accom-
panying Advisory Committee Notes stating that derivative actions contain "distinc-
tive aspects which require [the] special provisions. '26 The language of the section
15. Id.
16. Id. Mr. Timko appealed this order.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 104 U.S. 450 (1881).
22. 12B W. FLETCHER CYCLOPEIDA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5911 (2005).
23. Hawes, 104 U.S. at 460-61.
24. Id. at 460.
25. Lisa M Milani, The Continuous Ownership Requirement: A Bar to Meritorious Shareholder Derivative
Actions?, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1013, 1013 n.l (1986). There was a sequence of federal shareholder standing
rules that followed the adoption of Equity Rule 94. The progression went as follows: Equity Rule 27 replaced
Equity Rule 94 in 1912; Equity Rule 27 became Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938; Rule
23(b) became Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1966.
26. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1. Further indicating the seriousness with which Congress viewed the problem of
strike suits and meritless claims, the special provisions of Rule 23.1 contained not only a shareholder standing
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regarding standing codified the requirement that a plaintiff be "a shareholder or
member at the time of the transaction of which the plaintiff complains or that the
plaintiff's share or membership thereafter devolved on the plaintiff by operation of
law."27 Although the Rule clearly states the requirement that a plaintiff have owner-
ship at the time of the transaction complained, another ownership requirement is
implied under Rule 23.1-the plaintiff must have ownership at the commencement
of the suit.2 Courts have construed the language in Rule 23.1 asserting a derivative
action may be "brought by one or more shareholders ... to enforce a right of a
corporation" to require a plaintiff to own shares of the corporation when he files a
derivative action on its behalf to ensure that the plaintiff adequately represents the
corporation he claims to be vindicating.29 Seizing on the notion that a corpora-
tion's fate is in the hands of a shareholder who must be trusted to represent the
corporation to the fullest throughout, most courts have extended the ownership
requirement to necessitate a plaintiff to maintain continuous ownership of his
shares for the duration of the action. °
Many state legislatures, including Florida's, have adopted laws reflecting the same
concerns that compelled the codification of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1. 31
In 2002, the Florida legislature passed a statute entitled "Shareholders' Derivative
Actions. ' 32 It provides that:
(1) A person may not commence a proceeding in the right of a domestic or
foreign corporation unless the person was a shareholder of the corporation
when the transaction complained of occurred or unless the person became a
shareholder through transfer by operation of law from one who was a share-
holder at that time.33
The Florida statute, like those in many other states, seeks to curb predatory strike
suits by making it more difficult for plaintiffs to utilize shareholder derivative ac-
tions for purely personal reasons which may be contrary to the interests of the
requirement, but also the well-known demand requirement. While the demand requirement is commonly
viewed as an exhaustion requirement, one designed to encourage internal resolution of corporate disputes, it
functions essentially as another bar to prevent a plaintiff from achieving standing. See Daniel R. Fischel, The
Demand and Standing Requirements in Stockholder Derivative Actions, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 168, 169 (1977). The
Delaware Supreme Court described the effect of the demand requirement as one that "deter[s] costly, baseless
suits by creating a screening mechanism to eliminate claims where there is only a suspicion expressed solely in
conclusory terms." Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A. 2d 244, 255 (Del. 2000).
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
28. Schilling v. Blecher, 582 F.2d 995, 999 (5th Cir. 1978).
29. Id.
30. Id. (citing Tryforos v. Icarian Dev. Co., 518 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1091
(1976); Niesz v. Gorsuch, 295 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1961)).
31. 13 W. FLETCHER CYCLOPEIDA OF THE LAw OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5981 (2005).
32. FL. STAT. ANN. § 607.07401 (2005).
33. Id.
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corporation. 4 Prior to the enactment of this statute, Florida courts had expressed a
similar desire to prevent these predatory strike suits.35 In Karplus v. First Cont'l
Corp.,36 the Florida District Court of Appeals cited one of its 1992 decisions for the
proposition of "ensurting] that derivative actions are brought only by those indi-
viduals who have a legitimate stake in the corporation so that its interests are ade-
quately represented." 7 In accordance with the jurisprudence of many other states,
Florida courts have adopted the contemporaneous shareholder provision as a pre-
requisite to a derivative action."
While many states have similar provisions, not all are identical in scope or appli-
cation to Florida's standing requirement. For example, the California legislature has
not drawn such a hard line in its adoption of a contemporaneous ownership rule.39
Indeed, in a 1975 Legislative Committee Comment, the California Assembly ac-
knowledged it was relaxing its contemporaneous ownership requirement, likely be-
cause of the harsh consequence of the rule.4" On its face, the current California
statute only requires a plaintiff to have stock ownership at the time of the transac-
tion complained.4' However, this is not dispositive. In what is presumably a quest
for equity, the statute also provides California judges with a substantial amount of
discretion to allow a shareholder who does not meet the ownership requirement to
maintain an action upon a preliminary showing to the court.42
Although the contemporaneous ownership rule has been adopted in some form
by the vast majority of the country's state legislatures, many courts have questioned
the harshness of such a rule.43 Specifically, several decisions have raised the issue of
34. Timko v. Triarsi, 898 So. 2d 89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
35. Karplus v. First Cont'l Corp., 711 So. 2d 108, 110 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (citing South End Im-
provement Group, Inc. v. Mulliken, 602 So. 2d 1327, 1330 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).
36. Id.
37. Id. This statement by the Florida court echoed the stated goal of many legislatures, including Congress,
to ensure alignment of corporate and plaintiff interests and thereby prevent strike suits. Paul P. Harbrecht, The
Contemporaneous Ownership Rule in Shareholders' Derivative Suits, 25 UCLA L. REV. 1041, 1043 (1978). One
wonders if this goal has been taken to its extreme in the "protection of the corporation and its officials from the
scoundrel shareholder." Id. at 1048.
38. See 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 31.
39. While California is more lenient in its application of a contemporaneous ownership requirement, most
states, Florida among them, follow the guidelines endorsed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
40. CAL. CORP. CODE § 800.
41. Id.
42. As part of its preliminary hearing requirement, California requires a motion and hearing where the
plaintiff seeking standing demonstrates the following:
(i) there is a strong prima-facie case in favor of the claim asserted on behalf of the corporation, (ii)
no other similar action has been or is likely to be instituted, (iii) the plaintiff acquired the shares
before there was disclosure to the public or to the plaintiff of the wrongdoing of which plaintiff
complains, (iv) unless the action can be maintained the defendant may retain a gain derived from
defendant's willful breach of a fiduciary duty, and (v) the requested relief will not result in unjust
enrichment of the corporation or any shareholder of the corporation.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 800. Additionally, in California, a plaintiff must satisfy the demand requirement which,
like in many other courts around the country, can necessitate a separate inquiry.
43. Milani, supra note 25, at 1020.
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whether the same standing requirement should apply when a shareholder has been
divested of his ownership involuntarily." In Galliard v. Natomas Co.,4  a California
court held that a plaintiff who was divested of her shares through a provision in a
merger agreement did not lose standing to pursue a derivative action. 6 The court
found it significant that the plaintiff had lost her ownership involuntarily through a
forced exchange during a merger.47 Paramount to the court's decision was its belief
that requiring continuous ownership would allow a merger to prevent a lawsuit
that challenged the validity of that very merger.4 The court noted that its decision
would maintain the purpose of the California legislature's contemporaneous own-
ership rule because its holding would continue to prevent predatory strike suits.49
However, twenty years after the Galliard decision, in Grosset v. Wenass,0 the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal, Fourth District, indicated its disagreement with the Gal-
hard court's interpretation of California's contemporaneous ownership
requirement." Although the Grosset court was applying Delaware law, its dicta in-
dicated that the California standing requirement in derivative suits should be simi-
larly interpreted to align it with the majority of other jurisdictions. 2 Thus, it
appears the breadth of the contemporaneous ownership requirement in California
is currently unsettled.
Outside of California, two New York decisions conform with the notion put
forth in Galliard-namely, that a plaintiff should be allowed to continue his deriva-
tive action where his standing is terminated by the very acts that the plaintiff con-
tends were wrongful.5" In Albert v. Salzman, 4 the court expressed reluctance to
dismiss a worthy derivative action even where plaintiff lost standing after com-
mencing the action as a result of the plaintiff's own sale of his ownership interest.5 5
The court allowed another shareholder to continue in the original plaintiff's place
44. See Galliard v. Natomas Co., 219 Cal. Rptr. 74, 79 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Albert v. Salzman, 41 A.D. 2d
501 (1973); Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Co., 20 Fed. Serv. 2d 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Zauber v. Murray Say.
Ass'n, 591 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
45. 219 Cal. Rptr. 74 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 413.
48. Id. at 420. This consequence was described as an "incongruous result." Id.
49. Id. at 415. The court stated that under its holding, "suits by individuals who had acquired stock for the
sole purpose of bringing a derivative lawsuit" would not be allowed. Id.
50. 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 58 (Cal. Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
51. Id. at 70-73 (finding the holding in Galliard contrary to other jurisdictions' interpretation of the
continuous ownership requirement).
52. Id. at 70-72. The Grosset court actually cited Timko as an example of a case where the court required
ownership throughout the suit despite the statutory language only mandating the plaintiff possess shares at the
time of the transaction at issue.
53. Milani, supra note 25, at 1029.
54. Albert v. Salzman, 41 A.D. 2d 501 (1973).
55. Id. at 505. The plaintiff in Albert, claimed a breach of fiduciary duty by the directors of Papercraft
Corp. in negotiating a merger agreement with the company in which he owned shares, Odell Corp. Id. Plaintiff
specifically alleged that the directors of Papercraft had profited illegally from the merger. Id. The standing issue
arose when the plaintiff sold his stock after filing the derivative action. Id.
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based upon the principle that where an alternative means to continue a derivative
action exists, a valid action should be allowed to go forward. 6
Another New York court expanded on the concept from the Albert decision by
proposing that, in addition to considering whether an alternative means to con-
tinue the derivative action exists, a court should also take into account whether the
alternative means would be barred by the statute of limitations." In both decisions,
the New York courts were concerned with the inequity that would result from ter-
minating the derivative action due to the conduct of the alleged wrongdoers.
Finally, another court has recognized the distinction between the voluntary and
involuntary divestment of a shareholder's interest in a corporation."6 In Zauber v.
Murray Say. Ass'n,s9 a Texas court refused to declare that a plaintiff lacked standing
to proceed with a derivative action where he had been divested of his interest invol-
untarily.6° The court recognized the contemporaneous ownership requirement but
went on to review the underlying reason for the dispossession of the plaintiffs
shares.6 The opinion asserted that if a plaintiff had been deprived of ownership by
an act of the corporation having no legitimate business purpose, the plaintiff
should be allowed to maintain his action.62 The Galliard, Abrams, Albert and Zauber
decisions indicate that while courts recognize the contemporaneous ownership re-
quirement in derivative suits to prevent strike suits, not all are in agreement as to
the extent of its application. While preventing strike suits is still central to the
debate over standing requirements in derivative suits, some courts have expressed
concern over perceived inequities on shareholders from the application of such a
harsh rule.
III. SUMMARY OF THE COURT'S REASONING
In affirming the Circuit Court's order granting Triarsi's motion to dismiss, the Dis-
trict Court of Appeals of Florida, Fifth District, first looked at the history of share-
holder derivative proceedings.6" The court cited Larsen v. Island Developers, Ltd.64
for the proposition that "shareholder derivative suits were originally created by the
56. Id. at 506.
57. Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Co., 20 Fed. Serv. 2d 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The Abrams case presented
the familiar situation where a shareholder is compelled to exchange his shares of a corporation per a merger
agreement. In applying section 261 of title 8 of the Delaware Corporation Code, the Abrams court held that
when a shareholder was deprived of his interest in a corporation as a result of the merger and the shareholder
was proceeding in an action against a corporation that was a party to the merger, a court should proceed as if
the merger had not occurred. Id. at 173.
58. Milani, supra note 25, at 1029.
59. 591 S.W. 2d 932 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
60. Id. In Zauber, a plaintiff was divested of his interest in the company when the board of directors voted
to approve a reverse stock split.
61. Id. 936-37.
62. Id.
63. Timko v. Triarsi, 898 So. 2d 89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
64. 769 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
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common law as a means to police 'faithless directors and managers.'"65 While the
court recognized the function derivative suits serve in allowing shareholders to re-
dress injuries caused by improper acts of directors or officers, it also noted the
frequent abuse of the derivative suit mechanism.66 The filing of predatory strike
suits-where a shareholder obtains a stake in the company after a transaction has
occurred solely for the purpose of filing a derivative action-was of prevailing
concern.
67
The court noted that the Florida legislature, as many others around the country,
had enacted the contemporaneous ownership rule to prevent these predatory strike
suits by providing express standing requirements for shareholders wishing to insti-
tute a derivative proceeding.6" In examining legislative intent, the court stated that
the purpose of the shareholder standing requirement was to "ensure that derivative
actions are brought only by those individuals who have a legitimate stake in the
corporation so that its interests are adequately represented."
69
The court then examined the language of the contemporaneous ownership rule
in section 607.07401, Florida Statutes (2002). 7' Recognizing the objective of this
provision "to impose additional restrictions on a shareholder's common law right
to maintain a derivative suit," the court viewed the use of the words "may not" and
"unless" in the language of section 607.07401 as placing additional limits on this
common law right.7 These limitations, the court said, were aimed to prevent pred-
atory strike suits by ensuring that shareholders have a legitimate interest when pur-
suing a derivative action." Relying on these words, the court held that the common
law right of derivative action required continuous ownership throughout the pen-
dency of the suit for the reason that the language of the contemporaneous owner-
ship rule had not nullified it. 73 The court then cited to numerous opinions from
other jurisdictions that also upheld the common law continuous ownership
requirement.74
Judge Monaco, the lone dissenter, believed the statutory language, on its face,
required a different result. Judge Monaco pointed out two distinctions between his
65. Timko, 898 So. 2d at 90 (citing Larsan v. Island Developers, Limited, 769 So. 2d 1071, 1072 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2000)).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. (quoting Kaplus v. First Cont'l Corp., 711 So. 2d 108, 110 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)).
70. Id. at 91.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 91-92. One of the cases the court cites is Schilling v. Belcher, 582 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1978).
Although, the court in Schilling was applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1, the Timko court viewed the
federal rule as a "precursor to section 607.07401." The court believed that the Schilling case stood for the
proposition that the "sale of stock during pendency of appeal from judgment in derivative suit defeats standing
to continue." Tinko, 898 So. 2d at 92.
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW
ZACHARY D. COHEN
reading of the contemporaneous ownership rule and the majority's reading. First,
he read the statute to require an individual bringing a derivative action to be a
shareholder only when the transaction complained of occurred, not at all times the
suit was pending." He noted that the statutory language did not require ownership
throughout the derivative action.76 Second, he believed it was significant that the
statute referred to a "person" bringing a derivative action because earlier versions of
the statute had contained the word "shareholder."77 Judge Monaco viewed this as a
significant change in language because the Florida legislature, an entity with tre-
mendous experience in drafting legislation, had decided to expand the bounds of
individuals who could commence a derivative action.7" From the language of Flor-
ida's contemporaneous ownership rule, there was no indication that the legislature
was "building on the pre-existing common law requirement" of continuous owner-
ship throughout the derivative action." The language of the statute only supported
a derivative action standing requirement that necessitated share ownership when
the transaction at issue occurred.80
Judge Monaco then reviewed Schilling v. Belcher,"' a case the majority cited as
supporting its position, and explained why he believed the case compelled the
court to reach an opposite conclusion. 2 This case, decided prior to the enactment
of Florida Statute § 607.07401, but when a preceding Florida ownership require-
ment was in effect, held that "a shareholder who sells his or her stock pending the
appeal loses standing to further prosecute or defend the case, except to the extent
that the judgment runs personally in favor of that person."83 Although Schilling
involved a derivative action governed by Florida law, the U.S. Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit, applied the federal standing requirement codified in Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23.1."' Judge Monaco noted that the Schilling court looked to the
language of the statute and decided that the use of the word "stockholder" in the
preamble required an individual commencing a derivative proceeding to own
shares at the commencement of the action. Judge Monaco observed that although
the Schilling court was within its prerogative to apply federal law to that case, Flor-
ida courts are not bound by the Schilling holding in interpreting Florida law. 5
75. Id. at 94.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. From his dissent, it appears that Judge Monaco would not require stock ownership when the derivative
action was initiated, but only when the transaction complained of occurred.
81. 582 F. 2d 995 (5th Cir. 1978).
82. Timko, 898 So. 2d at 94-95.
83. Id. at 94.
84. See id. The Schilling court applied the standing requirement codified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23.1 because it believed the federal statute was in accordance with Florida law. Schilling, 582 F.2d at 999-1000.
As Judge Monaco points out, this ignores the plain language of the respective statutes.
85. Id.
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The dissenter opined that under Florida Statute § 608.131, the statute at issue in
Schilling and a predecessor to Florida Statute § 607.1436, one only had to prove
that he was a "stockholder of such corporation at the time of bringing the action
and that he was a stockholder of such corporation at the time of the transaction of
which he complain[ed]. ' '"6 He then reviewed the changes the Florida legislature
made in the statute succeeding 608.131, another predecessor to the current con-
temporaneous ownership rule. Judge Monaco noted the legislature removed lan-
guage that required an individual to be a shareholder at the commencement of the
suit. 7 He concluded that the actions of the Florida legislature indicated that the
continuous ownership requirement had been abolished under state law."8
In regards to this case, Judge Monaco observed that Timko was a shareholder at
both the time of the transaction complained of and the commencement of the
derivative suit." Furthermore, Timko was divested of his stake in the company
involuntarily through the actions of Triarsi.* According to the dissenting judge,
Florida Statute § 607.07401 was written to account for "this and similar scenarios
in which the shareholder loses that status by an operation of law."'" Judge Monaco
then cited Galliard v. Natomas Co.,92 an aforementioned California decision holding
"where a person lost her status as shareholder by virtue of a merger.., it would be
inequitable to require continuing ownership in order to maintain a derivative
suit."93 According to both Judge Monaco and the Galliard court, applying a contin-
uous ownership requirement through a derivative action would be inequitable
when the plaintiff involuntarily lost his shares because it would "lead to the incon-
gruous result of barring a lawsuit which challenges the wrongful acts of manage-
ment in bringing about the merger, because of the merger itself."94
IV. ANALYSIS
Legitimate concerns about derivative suits warrant application of the contempora-
neous ownership rule to prevent strike suits. To fulfill this goal, courts have
adopted a liberal interpretation of the rule requiring continuous ownership
throughout the suit. As Timko v. Triarsi indicates, however, not all derivative suits
in which the plaintiff shareholder is divested of his interest present a situation in-
volving a predatory suit. Focusing on statutory language, the dissent in Timko
presents a strong case as to why the plaintiff likely met the requirements to garner
shareholder standing. In this vein, there also exist situations that require additional
86. Id. at 95.
87. Id.
88. id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. 173 Cal. App. 3d 410 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
93. Id.
94. Id. (citing Galliard v. Natomas Co., 173 Cal. App. 410 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)).
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considerations to be factored into the standing analyis. These situations include
mergers or bad acts of management which divest share ownership, as well as situa-
tions where no one else can vindicate the rights of the company.
A. Statutory Interpretation Alone Supports Judge Monaco's Dissent
Reviewing the statutory language and legislative history, the dissenting judge in
Timko makes a compelling case for allowing the plaintiff to proceed with his deriv-
ative action.95 The codified language of Florida's contemporaneous ownership rule
only requires a plaintiff in a derivative action to have owned his shares "when the
transaction complained of occurred."96 This language is of particular importance in
light of the development of the contemporaneous ownership rule that the Florida
legislature endorsed in the 1970s when it enacted Florida Statute 607.147 to replace
608.131.97
It is possible that the Florida legislature was merely mimicking the language and
intent of Congress, but this does not mean that Florida's courts, in interpreting a
Florida statute, are restricted by a federal court's interpretation of a similar federal
statute. Schilling,9" the case where a Federal court applied Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23.1 upon its determination that Florida's contemporaneous ownership
rule was identical to the Federal Rule, represents an anomalous decision that is not
binding on Florida courts. It is the domain of state courts to interpret state law,
and Florida courts should make an independent determination in deciding the pa-
rameters of Florida statutory enactments.
Additionally, the fact that numerous jurisdictions have construed their contem-
poraneous ownership requirement to necessitate continuous ownership throughout
the duration of the suit, while a consideration, should not be the determinate fac-
tor in Timko.99 It is of equal significance that other courts have questioned this
stringent requirement and have then taken a more pragmatic approach the issue of
standing."° In interpreting state law for derivative suits, Florida's courts should
seek to ensure that neither management nor shareholders are able to profit from
inappropriate acts by shaping rules that do not lead to inherent inequalities in the
treatment of divested owners and those in control of the corporation.
95. Tinko, 898 So. 2d at 92-96.
96. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.07401 (2002).
97. Timko, 898 So. 2d at 95.
98. 582 F.2d 995.
99. Id. at 91-92 (citing Schilling v. Belcher, 582 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1978); Lewis v. Ward, 852 A.2d 896
(Del. 2004); Lewis v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 503 S.E. 2d 81 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998); A-Plus Janitorial & Carpet
Cleaning v. Employers' Workers' Comp. Ass'n, 936 P. 2d 916 (Okla. 1997); Christopher v. Liberty Oil & Gas
Corp., 665 So. 2d 410 (La. Ct. App. 1995); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Griffin, 541 N.E. 2d 172 (Ind. Ct. App.
1989); Weil v. Nw. Indus., Inc., 522 N.E.2d 172 (111. App. Ct. 1988); Yanow v. Teal Indus., Inc., 422 A.2d 311
(Conn. 1979)).
100. See Galliard v. Natomas Co., 173 Cal. App. 3d 410 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Albert v. Salzman, 41 A.D.2d
501 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973); Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum, 20 Fed. R. Serv.2d 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Zauber v.
Murray Say. Ass'n, 591 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
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B. Additional Considerations Dictate Exceptions to the Contemporaneous
Ownership Rule
It is of paramount importance that courts keep in mind the true purpose of deriva-
tive actions when formulating ownership rules dictating an individual plaintiff's
standing. At their core, derivative suits are equitable actions.' Many courts per-
ceive the standing requirement to be focused primarily on preventing predatory
strike suits, but they must not let this goal remove reason from their analysis. While
there is no doubt that the prevention of strike suits is one aim of the standing
requirement, courts should be more concerned with a principle that subsumes the
prevention of strike suits-ensuring that the individual plaintiff is representing the
interests of the corporation and, in turn, the totality of interests of the corpora-
tion's shareholders. In doing so, the question arises-at what point in time should
we be concerned with the representation of the corporation? A plaintiff in a deriva-
tive action will always be suing for a past action and, in certain situations, should
be allowed to represent the interests of the corporation if he can demonstrate his
interests were aligned with the corporation's at the point in time when the action
occurred.
The contemporaneous ownership requirement stated in Hawes reflects this con-
cern and many courts have expanded the ownership requirement to require contin-
uous ownership throughout the pendency of a suit. °2 However, blindly extending
the contemporaneous ownership requirement fails to take into account the reality
of a plaintiffs predicament where often he is challenging the legitimacy of an ac-
tion that divested his interest in a corporation. Courts can adequately protect
against predatory strike suits on a case-by-case basis by ensuring that the plaintiff's
interest are aligned with the corporations.0 3
Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to interfere with the internal workings
of a corporation. This hands-off approach is generally the proper role for the judi-
ciary in corporate matters, but passivity should not be taken to such an extreme
that it prevents intervention where the courts have the tools to perform a thorough
well-reasoned evaluation of the merits of a derivative suit, and such an evaluation
reveals a strong likelihood of oppression of the minority interests.0 4 This is particu-
larly true where a plaintiff had ownership at the time of the transaction complained
of. Courts should not abandon their duty to prevent oppression at any level, in-
cluding at the corporate level, where they have the opportunity to undertake a
101. Rosenfeld v. Zimmer, 254 P.2d 137, 116 C.A. 2d 719 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1953).
102. See Timko, 898 So. 2d at 92 (listing the various courts that have required ownership throughout the
pendency of a derivative suit).
103. Milani, supra note 25, at 1035. Ms. Milani writes "equitable considerations may outweigh a per se
requirement of continuous stock ownership in every instance. The absence of a present proprietary interest in a
corporation does not necessarily mean that a plaintiff has no stake in the outcome of the litigation such that a
plaintiff cannot adequately prosecute the corporation's right of action and represent the interest of similarly
situated shareholders."
104. See supra note 42 (detailing the procedure used in California courts).
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thorough examination of a shareholder interest. Because the opportunity for more
intricate assessment exists, courts should maintain the continuous ownership re-
quirement with three exceptions.
i. Merger situations that have terminated a shareholder's ownership
A merger can be a tool of the majority shareholders to squeeze minority sharehold-
ers out of the corporation. 5 Even if the merger requires approval of a majority of
shareholders, absent an agreement with other shareholders or a supermajority vot-
ing structure, a minority interest is powerless to prevent effectuation of the
merger.0 6 This was not always the case-at common law, unanimous consent of
shareholders was required to effectuate a merger. 7 Furthermore, some courts have
permitted directors to use a merger to terminate a minority shareholder's derivative
suit where a third party was acquiring the corporation.' 0
In a closely-held corporation, a merger that results in shareholder divestment
can be an impenetrable devise to prevent shareholder derivative actions. 9 This is
apparent because applying the contemporaneous ownership rule, it is not feasible
for a plaintiff to challenge an action where he lacks an ownership interest. Delaware
has recognized the potential misuse of a merger situation to manipulate ownership
and recognizes two instances in the merger context where the contemporaneous
ownership rule is not absolute: (i) where the merger is the subject of the claim of
fraud and (ii) where a merger is in reality a re-organization of the corporation that
does not divest the shareholder of his shares."' Beyond the instances recognized in
Delaware, if a merger divests the shareholder of his interest, it also automatically
prevents any challenge. This is, very arguably, an "incongruous result.""' A share-
holder who contends that the result was improper should be allowed to pursue a
challenge on the merger. Without this rule, the validity of such a merger would
never be challenged because any action doing so would be precluded by the very
thing it seeks to question.
105. F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS AND LLC
MEMBERS, ROBERT B. THOMPSON § 5:1 (2005).
106. Some states, including Delaware, go as far as to allow a controlling shareholder to effectuate a merger
without a formal vote of the shareholders, thus preventing any campaign by the minority to prevent such
action. In such a transaction, it could be argued that a formal vote is wasted efforts and, regardless of a failure
to object, shareholders of the subsidiary are protected by their appraisal rights. This right affords some protec-
tion, but a minority shareholder's rights are still limited in the respect that they are powerless to prevent the
merger. Id. at 5:4, 5-54. Additionally, many states allow "short form mergers" that permit a parent and subsidi-
ary to merge without a vote of the shareholders.
107. 12B W. FLETCHER CYCLOPEIDA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5906.10 (2005).
108. See Scattergood v. Perelman, 945 F. 2d 618, 626 (3d Cir. 1991) (plaintiff's standing in a derivative suit
was terminated by a cash out merger).
109. This would be particularly pertinent in a closely held corporation where only two stockholders exist as
in Timko.
110. Lewis v. Anderson, 477 A.2d 1040, 1047 n.10 (Del. 1984).
111. See Galliard v. Natomas Co., 173 Cal. App. 3d 410 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
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A valid counterargument is that the minority shareholders are protected by ap-
praisal rights. Indeed, appraisal rights are one method employed to protect dissent-
ing shareholders, where they seek to obtain an independent determination of the
fair value of their shares. The purpose of statutes affording this reevaluation on the
behalf of disgruntled shareholders is "to protect the property rights of dissenting
shareholders from actions by majority shareholders which alter the character of
their investment.""' In an appraisal proceeding, however, the issue is limited to the
amount which was paid for the dissenter's shares." 3 This remedy fails to provide
any outlet should a dissenter seek to invalidate a merger for impropriety. Indeed, in
most mergers, the majority's will should rule the day, but where the majority
breached a fiduciary duty to the minority in negotiating the merger, that aggrieved
minority should have the greater recourse. Applying the contemporaneous owner-
ship rule here would prevent dissenters from challenging a merger negotiated on
their behalf without the requisite fiduciary obligations necessary when shareholder
interest is represented. Accordingly, the contemporaneous ownership rule should
be relaxed in merger situations.
ii. Involuntary termination of ownership through a bad act of management
When shareholders are deprived of standing through a bad act of management,
courts should allow them to continue their derivative action. In creating exceptions
to the continuous ownership requirement, Delaware has acknowledged the poten-
tial for abuse of mergers by management. When one considers this exception in
conjunction with the widespread recognition of the different nature of voluntary
and involuntary divestment of a shareholders ownership stake, " 4 it is evident that
the exception should apply more broadly. Similar to the situation involving divest-
ment of ownership interest through a merger, in a closely held corporation when a
shareholder losses his shares through the bad acts of management, preventing a
shareholder from challenging the divestment effectively insulates the wrongdoers
from liability. Allowing such a result creates an inequitable situation of preventing
a challenge to a bad act because of the bad act itself. This is essentially the situation
in the Timko case where a fifty percent shareholder was unable to assert the com-
pany's interest because a contract had compelled him to relinquish his shares to his
co-owner. In accordance, when a bad act of management deprives a shareholders of
their shares, even outside the mergers context, shareholders should be allowed to
challenge the act that divested their interest.
Although a shareholder is able to bring a direct suit against management to
challenge the bad act, there is a strong argument to allow the shareholder to pursue
a derivative suit. When a shareholder's interest is deprived through some bad act of
112. FLETCHER, supra note 107, § 5906.10.
113. Id.
114. See Galliard, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 420.
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management, it is likely she is not the only individual harmed. Despite manage-
ment's prerogative which may or may not be to maximize shareholder return, ulti-
mately a corporation's purpose must reflect shareholder interest and management
must act accordingly. Allowing a shareholder to bring a derivative suit where he or
she has been divested of ownership through management wrongdoing is more eq-
uitable because it allows an independent determination regarding the divestment of
ownership. Without such an exception, the alternative results in management's al-
leged bad act preventing such a challenge. Tolerating a derivative suit in such situa-
tions also increases efficiency because allowing one shareholder to represent the
entirety of shareholder interest prevents many separate direct suits. Therefore, an-
other exception to the contemporaneous ownership rule should be permitted
where a shareholder is divested of ownership through a bad act of management.
iii. Situations in which no one else can vindicate the rights of the company
All the attention given to preventing strike suits can create an inequitable smoke
screen to corporate pilfering by management. One method to combat a lack of
corporate accountability would be to allow a shareholder lacking ownership at the
commencement of the suit because of an involuntary divestment, but retaining
ownership at the time of the transaction in question, to pursue a derivative action
when no one else can vindicate the rights of the company. Allowing a plaintiff to
proceed with such an action, despite a lack of ownership, provides an equitable
solution to the failure of a company to regulate the improprieties of its manage-
ment. Indeed, situations do arise where no other shareholders can bring an equita-
ble claim because of management's wrongdoing. A court must be careful not to
substitute its business judgment for that of the corporation's directors, but instead
should limit its focus to the likelihood of redress by the corporation. In acknowl-
edging standing in these cases, courts would apply a rigorous examination of the
shareholder's interest when evaluating whether he will actually act in such a man-
ner to vindicate the company's rights. A court should pay particular attention to
the timing of the acquisition of the plaintiffs shares as well as whether other poten-
tial plaintiffs exist as current shareholders. "5 This solution would be employed
rarely, but would contribute to a more equitable solution for the treatment of
plaintiffs in derivative actions.
V. CONCLUSION
Timko v. Triarisi demonstrates that courts should take a more flexible approach in
determining when a shareholder has standing to maintain a derivative action. In
particular, the focus of a court's analysis should remain on whether a shareholder
115. This requirement echoes the holding in Albert v. Salzmen, where the court suggested that a factor in
the standing analysis in derivative actions should be whether an alternative means to continue the derivative
action exists. 41 A.D.2d at 505.
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or former shareholder can adequately represent the interests of the corporation.
The contemporaneous ownership rule is intended to remove cases where a share-
holder may not have the corporation's interests in mind. However, this rule, when
applied too stringently, can lead to inequitable results. When determining standing,
if shareholders fail to retain continuous ownership throughout their suit, courts
should consider whether divestment of their shares occurred as a result of a merger
or a bad act of management or whether the situation is one where no one else can
vindicate the rights of the company. The Timko court missed an excellent opportu-
nity to clarify and apply this doctrine in a more equitable fashion.
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